THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BEFORE

THE OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE APPEALS

In the Matter of:

VERONICA WILLIAMS,

Employee

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Agency

VERONICA WILLIAMS, Employee, Pro Se
Sara White, Esq., Agency Representative

OEA Matter No.: 2401-0042-10
Date of Issuance: May 22, 2012

Sommer J. Murphy, Esq.
Administrative Judge

INITIAL DECISION

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 16, 2009, Veronica Williams (“Employee”) filed a petition for appeal with the Office of Employee Appeals (“the OEA” or “the Office”) contesting the District of Columbia Public Schools’ (“Agency” or “DCPS”) action of terminating her employment through a Reduction-in-Force (“RIF”). The effective date of the RIF was November 2, 2009. Employee’s position of record at the time her position was abolished was an ET-15 Science Teacher at Ron Brown Middle School (“Ron Brown”). Employee was in Educational Service status at the time she was terminated.

I was assigned this matter on or around November of 2011. On February 17, 2012, I issued an Order requiring the parties to submit briefs on the issue of whether Agency conducted the instant RIF in accordance with applicable District laws, statues, and regulations. Agency submitted a response to the Undersigned on March 12, 2012. On April 12, 2012, Employee requested an extension of time in which to file a brief. The motion was granted, and Employee submitted a brief on May 3, 2012. The record is now closed.

JURISDICTION

This Office has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to D.C. Official Code §1-606.03 (2001).
ISSUE

Whether Agency’s action of separating Employee from service pursuant to a RIF was done in accordance with all applicable laws, rules, or regulations.

BURDEN OF PROOF

OEA Rule 628.1, 59 DCR 2129 (March 16, 2012) states:

The burden of proof with regard to material issues of fact shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. “Preponderance of the evidence” shall mean:

That degree of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find a contested fact more probably true than untrue.

OEA Rule 628.2 id. states:

The employee shall have the burden of proof as to issues of jurisdiction, including timeliness of filing. The agency shall have the burden of proof as to all other issues.

FINDINGS OF FACTS, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

On September 10, 2009, former D.C. School Chancellor Michelle Rhee authorized a Reduction-in-Force (“RIF”) pursuant to D.C. Code § 1-624.02, 5 DCMR Chapter 15, and Mayor’s Order 2007-186. Chancellor Rhee stated that the RIF was necessitated for budgetary reasons, explaining that the 2010 DCPS fiscal year budget was not sufficient to support the current number of positions in the schools.¹

Although the instant RIF was authorized pursuant to D.C. Code § 1-624.02,² which encompasses more extensive procedures, for the reasons explained below, I find that D.C. Official Code § 1-624.08 (“Abolishment Act or the Act”) is the more applicable statute to govern this RIF.

¹ See Agency’s Answer, Tab 1 (December 17, 2009).
² D.C. Code § 1-624.02 states in relevant part that:
   (a) Reduction-in-force procedures shall apply to the Career and Educational Services… and shall include:
   (1) A prescribed order of separation based on tenure of appointment, length of service including creditable federal and military service, District residency, veterans preference, and relative work performance;
   (2) One round of lateral competition limited to positions within the employee’s competitive level;
   (3) Priority reemployment consideration for employees separated;
   (4) Consideration of job sharing and reduced hours; and
   (5) Employee appeal rights.
Section § 1-624.08 states in pertinent part that:

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, regulation, or collective bargaining agreement either in effect or to be negotiated while this legislation is in effect for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and each subsequent fiscal year, each agency head is authorized, within the agency head's discretion, to identify positions for abolishment (emphasis added).

(b) Prior to February 1 of each fiscal year, each personnel authority (other than a personnel authority of an agency which is subject to a management reform plan under subtitle B of title XI of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997) shall make a final determination that a position within the personnel authority is to be abolished.

(c) Notwithstanding any rights or procedures established by any other provision of this subchapter, any District government employee, regardless of date of hire, who encumbers a position identified for abolishment shall be separated without competition or assignment rights, except as provided in this section (emphasis added).

(d) An employee affected by the abolishment of a position pursuant to this section who, but for this section would be entitled to compete for retention, shall be entitled to one round of lateral competition pursuant to Chapter 24 of the District of Columbia Personnel Manual, which shall be limited to positions in the employee's competitive level.

(e) Each employee selected for separation pursuant to this section shall be given written notice of at least 30 days before the effective date of his or her separation.

In Mezile v. D.C. Department on Disability Services, the D.C. Superior Court found that “the language of § 1-624.08 is unclear as to whether it replaced § 1-624.02 entirely, or if the government can only use it during times of fiscal emergency.”³ The Court also found that both laws were current and that the government triggers the use of the applicable statute by using “specific language and procedures.”⁴

However, the Court of Appeals took a different position. In Washington Teachers’ Union, the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) conducted a 2004 RIF “to ensure balanced budgets, rather than deficits in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005.”⁵ The Court of Appeals found that the 2004 RIF, conducted for budgetary reasons, triggered the Abolishment Act (“the

⁴ Id. at p. 5.
Act”) instead of “the regular RIF procedures found in D.C. Code § 1-624.02.” The Court stated that the “ordinary and plain meaning of the words used in § 1-624.08(c) appears to leave no doubt about the inapplicability of § 1-624.02 to the 2004 RIF.”

The Abolishment Act applies to positions abolished for fiscal year 2000 and subsequent fiscal years (emphasis added). The legislation pertaining to the Act was enacted specifically for the purpose of addressing budgetary issues resulting in a RIF. The Act provides that, “notwithstanding any rights or procedures established by any other provision of this subchapter,” which indicates that it supersedes any other RIF regulations. The use of the term ‘notwithstanding’ carries special significance in statutes and is used to “override conflicting provisions of any other section.” Further, “it is well established that the use of such a ‘notwithstanding clause’ clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any other sections.”

The Abolishment Act was enacted after § 1-624.02, and thus, is a more streamlined statute for use during times of fiscal emergency. Moreover, the persuasive language of § 1-624.08, including the term ‘notwithstanding’, suggests that this is the more applicable statutory provision to conduct RIFs resulting from budgetary constraints. Accordingly, I am primarily guided by § 1-624.08 for RIFs authorized due to budgetary restrictions. Under this section, an employee whose position was terminated may only contest before this Office:

1. That he or she did not receive written notice thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of their separation from service; and/or

2. That he or she was not afforded one round of lateral competition within their competitive level.

Employee argues that Agency failed to follow the procedures at outlined in D.C. Official Code §1-624.08 when it implemented the instant RIF. Employee further alleges that Agency violated several subchapters of the D.C. Municipal Regulations (“DCMR”) as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1971. Employee states that she suffered a knee injury while on duty and requested, but was not granted, Workman’s Compensation benefits. Employee contends that she should have received Workman’s Compensation benefits from Agency, and would have therefore been exempted from being terminated under the RIF.

Agency submits that it conducted the RIF in accordance with the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations and the D.C. Official Code. Agency states that it provided Employee

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6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 1125.
10 Id.
12 See Addendum to Petition for Appeal (October 21, 2011). Employee cites to alleged violations of Title 6B, Chapter 24 of the DCMR, Subsections 2000, 2429, and 2430.
13 Petition for Appeal (October 16, 2009).
with one round of lateral competition, which resulted in her being ranked the lower of two Science Teachers within her competitive level. Agency also contends that Employee was properly given thirty (30) days written notice prior to the effective date of her termination.

Under Title 5 DCMR § 1501.1, the Superintendent of DCPS Schools is authorized to establish competitive areas when conducting a RIF so long as those areas are based “upon all or a clearly identifiable segment of the mission, a division or a major subdivision of the Board of Education, including discrete organizational levels such as an individual school or office.” For the 2009/2010 academic school year, former DCPS Chancellor Rhee determined that each school would constitute a separate competitive area. In accordance with Title 5, DCMR § 1502.1, competitive levels in which employees subject to the RIF competed were based on the following criterion:

1. The pay plan and pay grade for each employee;

2. The job title for each employee; and

3. In the case of specialty elementary teachers, secondary teachers, middle school teachers and teachers who teach other specialty subjects, the subject taught by the employee.\(^\text{14}\)

Here Ron Brown Middle School was identified as a competitive area, and ET-15 Science Teacher was determined to be the competitive level in which Employee competed. According to the Retention Register provided by Agency, there were two (2) Science Teacher positions at Ron Brown, and one (1) of those positions was identified to be abolished under the RIF. Because Employee was not the only person within her competitive level, she was required to compete in a round of lateral competition.

According to Title 5, DCMR § 1503.2 et al.:

If a decision must be made between employees in the same competitive area and competitive level, the following factors, in support of the purposes, programs, and needs of the organizational unit comprising the competitive area, with respect to each employee, shall be considered in determining which position shall be abolished:

(a) Significant relevant contributions, accomplishments, or performance;

(b) Relevant supplemental professional experiences as demonstrated on the job;

\(^{14}\) Agency Brief (March 12, 2012).
(c) Office or school needs, including: curriculum, specialized education, degrees, licenses or areas of expertise; and

(d) Length of service.

Based on § 1503.1, Agency gave the following weights to each of the aforementioned factors when implementing the RIF:

(a) Office or school needs, including: curriculum, specialized education, degrees, licenses or areas of expertise - (75%)

(b) Significant relevant contributions, accomplishments, or performance – (10%)

(c) Relevant supplemental professional experiences as demonstrated on the job – (10%)

(d) Length of service – (5%)¹⁵

Agency argues that nothing within the DCMR, applicable case law, or D.C. Official Code prevents it from exercising its discretion to weigh the aforementioned factors as it sees fit. Agency cites to American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. OPM, 821 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1987), wherein the Office of Personnel Management was given “broad authority to issue regulations governing the release of employees under a RIF…including the authority to reconsider and alter its prior balance of factors to diminish the relative importance of seniority.” I agree with this position and find that Agency had the discretion to weigh the factors enumerated in 5 DCMR 1503.2, in a consistent manner throughout the instant RIF.

**Competitive Level Documentation Form**

Agency employs the use of a Competitive Level Documentation Form (“CLDF”) in cases where employees subject to a RIF must compete against each other in lateral competition. In conducting the instant RIF, the principal of Ron Brown was given discretion to assign numerical values to the first three factors listed in Title 5, DCMR § 1503.2, *supra*, as they deemed appropriate, while the “length of service” category was completed by the Department of Human Resources (“DHR”).

Employee received a total of twelve and a half (12.5) points on her CLDF and was therefore ranked the lowest in her competitive level. Employee’s CLDF stated in pertinent part:

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¹⁵ It should be noted that OEA has consistently held that DCPS is allowed discretion to accord different weights to the factors enumerated in 1503.2. Thus, Agency is not required to assign equal values to each of the factors. *See White v. DCPS*, OEA Matter No. 2401-0014-10 (December 30, 2001); *Britton v. DCPS*, OEA Matter No. 2401-0179-09 (May 24, 2010).
“Ms. Williams has failed to appropriately deliver quality science instruction to her 8th grade students. During Mrs. William’s tenure as a science teacher 80% of the students she taught failed the science portion of the DC-CAS test. Mrs. Williams has failed to effectively plan for long and short term academic goals. Mrs. Williams also has difficulty working professionally with her colleagues. She is often argumentative and has been involved in several negative episodes with other members of the school staff. Mrs. Williams has reported to work and mandated professional meetings late.”16

**Office or school needs**

This category is weighted at 75% on the CLDF and includes: curriculum, specialized education, degrees, licenses or areas of expertise. Employee received a total of one (1) point out of a possible ten (10) points in this category and has failed to provide any credible evidence that would bolster a score in this area. In addition, it was within the principal’s discretion to assign a numerical value in this category.

**Significant relevant contributions, accomplishments, or performance**

This category is weighted at 10% on the CLDF and includes factors such as student outcomes, ratings, awards, and attendance. Employee received zero (0) points in this area, and has failed to provided any documentation to indicate her relevant contributions to the student body at Ron Brown.

**Relevant supplemental professional experiences as demonstrated on the job**

This category accounts for 10% of the CLDF. Employee received a total of zero (0) points and has not provided any documentation to supplement additional points being awarded here.

**Length of service**

This category accounts for 5% of the CLDF and was calculated by the Department of Human Resources by adding the following: 1) years of experience; 2) military bonuses; 3) D.C. residency points; and 4) rating add—four years of service was given for employees with an “outstanding” or “exceeds expectations” evaluation within the past year. The length of service calculation, in addition to the other factors, were weighted and added together, resulting in a ranking for each competing employee.

Employee had a Service Computation Date (“SCD”) of 1987, which equates to twenty-two (22) years of experience on her CLDF. Employee did not receive points for D.C. Residency, 

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16 *Agency Brief*, Exhibit B (March 12, 2012).
Veterans Preference, or the ratings add for an “Exceeds Expectation” evaluation during the prior academic school year, and she has not disputed Agency’s calculation in this area.

In reviewing the documents of record, Employee does not offer any statutes, case law, or other regulations to refute Agency’s position regarding the principal’s authority to utilize discretion in completing an employee’s CLDF during the course of the instant RIF. In Washington Teachers’ Union Local No. 6, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Bd. of Educ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 109 F.3d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the D.C. Court of Appeals, in evaluating several union arguments concerning a RIF, stated that “school principals have total discretion to rank their teachers” and noted that performance evaluations are “subjective and individualized in nature.”17 According to the CLDF, Employee received a total score of twelve and a half (12.5) points after all of the factors outlined above were tallied and scored. The other Science Teacher in Employee’s competitive level received a total of fifty (50) points on their CLDF, a score much higher than Employee’s. Again, Employee has not proffered any evidence to suggest that a re-evaluation of her CLDF scores would result in a different outcome.18

Accordingly, I find that the Principal of Ron Brown had discretion in completing Employee’s CLDF, as he or she was in the best position to observe and evaluate the criteria enumerated in DCMR §1503.2, supra, when implementing the instant RIF. While it is unfortunate that Agency had to release any employee as a result of budgetary constraints, there is nothing within the record would lead the Undersigned to believe that the RIF was conducted unfairly. I therefore find that Employee was properly afforded one round of lateral competition as required by D.C. Official Code § 1-624.08.

Title 5, §1506 of the DCMR provides the notice requirements that must be given to an employee affected by a RIF. Section 1506.1 states that “an employee selected for separation shall be given specific written notice at least thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of the separation. The notice shall state specifically what action is taken, the effective date of the action, and other necessary information regarding the employee’s status and appeal rights.” Additionally, the D.C. Official Code § 1-624.08(e) which governs RIFs provides that an Agency shall (emphasis added) give an employee thirty (30) days notice after such employee has been selected for separation pursuant to a RIF (emphasis added).

Here, Employee received her RIF notice on October 2, 2009, and the RIF effective date was November 2, 2009. The notice stated that Employee’s position was being abolished as a result of a RIF. The notice further provided Employee with information regarding her right to appeal the termination. It is therefore undisputed that Employee was given the required thirty (30) days written notice prior to the effective date of the RIF.

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17See also American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 821 F.2d 761, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the federal government has long employed the use of subjective performance evaluations to help make RIF decisions.)
18See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (stating that a material fact is one which might affect the outcome of the case under governing law.)
In an addendum to her petition for appeal, Employee cites to Agency’s alleged violations of Chapter 24 of the DCMR, subsections 2000, 2429, and 2430, which address rules pertinent to the Displaced Employees Program. Employee; however, has failed to expound upon these arguments in any subsequent filings with this Office and has not proffered any evidence to substantiate or support her positions concerning such alleged violations. Therefore, I am unable to address the merits, if any, of these claims.

Employee also argues that an on-the-job injury she sustained in August 20, 2009 should have precluded her from being terminated under the RIF. Employee states that “I completed an accident report, but the head of security in my school told me she had to submit the form(s) to her supervisor and I didn’t receive my copy before her company was fired. Mr. Darrin Slade, the principal, at Ronald H. Brown Middle School refused to submit workman’s compensation forms on my behalf or honor my doctors’ requests on my behalf.” Employee believes that she should have received Workers Compensation benefits prior to being subjected to the RIF and would therefore have been immune to termination.

Title 23 of the District of Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act of 1978 created a Workers Compensation Program (“Program”) for District employees who are injured or killed during the performance of their public duties. Under the Program, eligible employees may continue to receive a percentage of their monthly salary while on partial or full disability. In order to receive these benefits, the injured employee must apply for them. Following receipt of a claim, the Mayor may conduct an investigation, including requiring the employee to submit to a medical examination. The Mayor is then required to make findings of fact and to grant or deny the claim for benefits. If the claim is denied, the employee may request a hearing before the Department of Employment Services (“DOES”) to challenge the Mayor’s determination.

In her brief, Employee provides copies of her medical records relevant to the injuries she sustained while on the job. However, a Workers Compensation claim was never filed by Employee or her supervisor, thus she was not receiving benefits under the Program at the time of her termination. A claim of this type is required to be filed with the Mayor’s office or with DOES in the cases where a claim is denied and an aggrieved employee elects to appeal the Mayor’s denial for a claim of benefits. Assuming, arguendo, that Employee was receiving Workers Compensation benefits at the time of the RIF, I find no credible evidence in the record to support Employee’s contention that she would have been immune from termination. Furthermore, Employee does not claim that being terminated under the RIF was an act of Agency’s retaliation against her because of the injury she sustained.

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23 Id.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that Agency’s action of abolishing Employee’s position was done so in accordance with D.C. Official Code § 1-624.08 and the Reduction-in-Force which resulted in her removal is upheld.

ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that Agency’s action of abolishing Employee’s position through a Reduction-In-Force is UPHELD

FOR THE OFFICE:

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SOMMER J. MURPHY, ESQ.
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE